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SECURITY INTERESTS RECONSIDERED
Douglas G. Baird*
C ODIFICATIONS that stand the test of time rest upon coher-
ent first principles. Article 9 is no exception; its drafters began
with a number of assumptions and took care to write a codification
of the law of security interests that was consistent with those
assumptions. These principles are set out in Grant Gilmore's trea-
tise on security interests' and they are familiar to every student of
secured transactions. They can be summarized in a few sentences.
A security interest is not a general right to take priority over the
claims of other creditors, but rather a priority right that is linked to
specific collateral. A creditor who takes a nonpossessory security
interest creates an ostensible ownership problem and should pre-
sumptively have a duty to cure it by making a public filing. The
public filing, however, need only give notice that the secured credi-
tor has or in the future may take an interest in particular types of
collateral. There is no duty to record the details of the transaction.
Finally, a creditor who acts in good faith and cures the ostensible
ownership problem has the right to take a security interest in the
personal property of the debtor.2
Nearly five decades have passed since the basic contours of Arti-
cle 9 were put in place, and it is useful to revisit these principles
and subject them to new scrutiny. We can take advantage of the
work of scholars who have studied Article 9. Moreover, we can
ask to what extent the assumptions of the drafters rest upon the
technology that was available fifty years ago, and whether inter-
vening technological changes should lead us to different first
principles.
Legal rules cannot be separated from the context in which they
operate. When Article 9 was first drafted in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, long distance telephone calls were expensive and only
*Harry A. Bigelow Professor of Law and Dean, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See 1 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965).
2 1 id. §§ 9.1, 15.1-.2; see Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the
Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605,
605-13 (1981).
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a few computers existed. Plain-paper copying machines did not
exist at all. Before lawyers had personal computers, it made no
sense to have a legal regime in which they might search for financ-
ing statements from their desktops. Now it does.
Financial markets have also undergone a revolution in the last
two decades. Accounts receivable and many other forms of
secured debt are securitized.3 One of the most common forms of
security interest in personal property, the purchase money security
interest in an automobile, is now also routinely securitized.4 A per-
son who wants to borrow to buy a new car now has access (through
intermediaries) to global capital markets. The new technologies
that brought about these changes also suggest that we should think
differently about the law governing security interests.
In this Article, I look at several common types of secured trans-
actions and use them as vehicles for exploring the assumptions that
underlie Article 9.5 Part I of the Article focuses on the equipment
financer and on whether equipment financing transactions create
an ostensible ownership problem that we should solve through a
public filing system. I also use this example as a way of asking the
more fundamental question: should the law of personal property
continue to draw the strong connection it does between ownership
and possession?
In Parts II and III, I look at the lender who takes a security inter-
est in all the debtor's assets. I first use this transaction to ask
whether we should link the priority rights of a creditor to an inter-
est in specific property. I then go on to ask whether it makes sense,
if we are to have a filing system, to have notice filing rather than
transactional filing.
Parts IV and V examine two more specialized transactions-
security interests that back up insider guarantees, and factoring-
to question whether we should continue to allow all secured lend-
ers who jump through the same hoops to enjoy priority over gen-
3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: A Guide to the Principles of Asset
Securitization 4 (2d ed. 1993).
4 See Tamar Frankel, Securitization: Structured Financing, Financial Assets Pools, and
Asset-Backed Securities § 2.4.4, at 38 n.13 (1991).
5 For another analysis of the different roles that secured credit plays, see Randal C.
Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645, 649-53
(1992).
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eral creditors. I argue that both the lender who insists upon a
secured guarantee from the owner-manager of the firm and the
factor who purchases accounts receivable impose costs on third
parties that other creditors do not.
I conclude that Article 9 may not give proper weight to the costs
that some secured transactions impose. It may rely too heavily on
the idea that all security interests are presumptively the same and
that those who take security interests in good faith and give notice
should be entitled to priority over general creditors.
I. EQUIPMENT FINANCING AND THE PROBLEM OF
OSTENSIBLE OWNERSHIP
Those who finance the purchase of machine tools and other large
capital assets resemble real estate lenders and equipment lessors.
In all of these transactions, tax considerations often drive the way a
firm finances its acquisition of assets. Moreover, in each of these
transactions the collateral at stake has a readily ascertainable liqui-
dation value that can be realized in the event the debtor defaults.
For example, there is a dramatic difference between the ability of a
creditor to realize the value of an oil-drilling rig after a firm fails
and the ability of that same creditor to realize on the firm's
accounts receivable. The oil-drilling rig has a ready market value,
while accounts receivable typically plunge in value when the firm
liquidates. To be sure, the equipment financer, like the real estate
lender or the equipment lessor, is at risk for a general change in
market conditions: the demand for oil drilling rigs can collapse, as
it did in the early 1980s. But this is a market risk a lender faces; it
is not connected to a particular debtor.
In other contexts, the primary purpose of a security interest may
be to give a secured creditor a priority over a firm's other creditors
in the event that the firm encounters financial distress and cannot
meet its fixed obligations. In the case of the equipment financer,
however, the security interest may serve a different purpose. A
lender may lend because it is confident that the procedures avail-
able to it in the event of default will allow it to realize much of the
amount of the loan in the event of default. Thus, the lender may
take a security interest in large part because its rights upon default
against the debtor are greater than they would be if it did not take
security. Given its rights as a secured creditor, the equipment
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financer faces comparatively few obstacles in seizing the goods and
selling them to someone else. Security interests may therefore be
valuable to equipment financers in large part because the debt col-
lection procedures available to an unsecured lender are much more
onerous,6 but these differences do not seem connected to the spe-
cial characteristics of the secured lender. Hence, one question a
law reformer should ask in this context is not whether Article 9
should be changed, but whether the debt collection procedures
available to the general creditor make sense.
We must also address the distinct issues concerning the equip-
ment financer's rights against third parties. A security interest pro-
tects the equipment financer from different kinds of debtor
misbehavior, the most obvious of which is the fraudulent sale of
the asset to a third party. Other kinds of misbehavior include
allowing a tax lien to be formed on the property or using the prop-
erty as collateral in some other secured transaction.7
Article 9 requires an equipment financer to make a public filing
if it wants to protect itself against a subsequently perfected secured
creditor or against a good-faith buyer who takes possession of the
property without knowledge of the security interest.8 In this con-
text, we should ask whether a filing requirement makes sense.
Third parties, secured parties, and levying creditors cannot draw
the inference of ownership from possession in Article 9. It has no
doctrine analogous to the holder-in-due-course concept. Instead,
ownership of assets is firmly rooted in the derivation principle: the
rights of a purchaser of an asset turn in the first instance on the
rights of its transferor.9 The rule that secured creditors must give
notice of their property interest is an exception to this principle.
It might seem that creditors and purchasers of machinery cannot
rely on the Article 9 filing system to establish a debtor's title to the
asset. A failure to find a filing does not, by itself, assure creditors
6 Most conspicuously, an unsecured creditor cannot conduct the sale of property seized
to satisfy the debt. This task typically falls to a state official such as a sheriff.
7 The equipment financer is protected from subsequent tax liens under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6323(a) (Supp. V 1993), and from preexisting and subsequent secured creditors under
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1990).
8 U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
9 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Security
Interests in Personal Property 3-8 (2d ed. 1987).
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or purchasers that the debtor owns the machine. To ensure that
the debtor owns the machine, they must find out how the debtor
acquired the machine. That is, they must ensure that the debtor
did not lease the machine from a third-party or acquire it from
someone else subject to a security interest.
The status quo, however, may not place undue burdens on either
equipment financers or those who want to find out whether the
debtor owns its equipment. The equipment financer must incur
only the costs of an Article 9 filing, whereas a potential purchaser
need only search the files and then ask the buyer for a bill of sale.
Third parties can infer ownership from the debtor's possession of
the machine, the existence of a bill of sale, and the absence of an
Article 9 filing. Even though no single source of information about
ownership exists, this may not matter much if going to these three
sources is relatively straightforward. This is the logic that justifies
the absence of a filing requirement for leases.10 Because anyone
who wants to find out about the debtor's title must demand a bill of
sale, the debtor who is merely a lessee cannot mislead potential
creditors even when lessors have no fling requirement.
When one attacks the problem from this perspective, the law
reform issue that we face for this sort of secured transactions prob-
lem is straightforward: how can we make the Article 9 filing system
simpler? The contours of such a filing system would take advan-
tage of the revolution in data processing that has taken place over
the last 50 years. For instance, as many commentators have noted,
there is no longer any justification for local filing systems or the
requirement that a filing be done under the debtor's name when a
debtor's social security number or taxpayer identification number
could be used instead." Nor is there a continuing need for an offi-
10 For a careful study of the relationship between secured transactions and leases and
the justifications for filing requirements, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and
Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals To Extend
Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 683 (1988).
11 For a paper advocating that the law of secured transactions should be federalized and
that the filing system should be a national one, see David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and
Bankruptcy: A Call for the Federalization of Personal Property Security Law, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1987, at 53. For a discussion of the need to take account of
technological changes in reforming Article 9's filing system, see Lynn M. LoPucki,
Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic
Highway, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1992, at 5. For a report of an ABA Task Force
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cial to record the filing. Instead, the debtor itself could record the
filing on an electronic bulletin board accessible to everyone. This
would permit filing searches to be done for a fraction of their cur-
rent cost.12 In addition, because the system could be national (and
eventually international) in its scope, there would be no need for
the complexities that now arise when a debtor changes residence or
the collateral moves from one jurisdiction to another.
It is worth emphasizing that having a national filing system does
not itself require the federalization of these provisions in Article 9.
Article 9 could be drafted in a way such that each state recognized
the same self-funding organization as the instrumentality responsi-
ble for posting filings on an electronic bulletin board available to
everyone on Internet or other national electronic networks.13 Fil-
ing systems could also be entirely private. For example, state
incorporation laws could require the debtor to state on its corpo-
rate charter the agent with whom any security interests would be
filed. These agents would be required to provide on-line access to
their files. Those who wanted to file against the debtor and those
who sought information about the debtor could then go to this
agent.
In the electronic world in which we already live, filing a financ-
ing statement or searching any agent's file should prove to be easy.
After the point at which a secured creditor files, the filing system
already is privatized.14 Databases such as Lexis transfer the infor-
mation in the public files onto their own systems. The initial
chances of error, the delays inherent in transferring the files from
state indexes to private filing systems, and the costs of making
these transfers might all be largely avoided if we moved further in
this direction.
Even such dramatic changes in the filing system, however, may
assume too much about the status quo. The bold question is not
chairperson on reform of the filing system, and the potential costs and benefits of filing by
taxpayer identification number, see Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for
Reform of the Article 9 Filing System, 44 Okla. L. Rev. 99, 112-13 (1991).
12 See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 16-19.
13 Alternatively, common protocols could be adopted so that files could be maintained
in different computers that were linked on a network. A single search request might
examine all the relevant files. See id. at 17-19.
14 See id. at 17.
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whether the existing system can be rationalized and improved
upon, but whether its initial premises are sound. The common-law
derivation rule emerged in an earlier era, and today it is no longer
followed when negotiable instruments, land, and large moveable
assets such as airplanes and automobiles are involved. Thus, we
should consider whether the rules governing the transfer of owner-
ship of private property should be substantially changed to accom-
modate large capital assets such as plant machinery.'5
Perhaps the principal problem is simply that of creating a way to
identify a piece of personal property uniquely.16 Once there is a
standard that everyone can easily adopt (such as attaching an
indelible serial number to each asset), it is possible to create a pub-
lic filing system that would govern the transfer of all assets. Along
these lines, recent advances in cryptography now allow us to create
a mechanism to ensure that only the registered owner of an asset
has the power to make a filing and thus possesses the power to
transfer ownership of the asset. 7 If everyone were to use this
mechanism, we would be able to trace the ownership of every asset
and only the rightful owner of the asset would have the ability to
transfer it or to encumber it.
But creating a unique way to identify an asset is difficult in a
world in which capital assets do not have discrete sizes. Just as a
large computer has a number of discrete components, a large
machine tool can similarly be broken down into its many different
parts. It is worth emphasizing, however, the role that law plays in
this environment. A unique system of identification works only if
there is a convention that everyone recognizes; it does little good
for me to devise one unique way of identifying an asset and for you
to devise another. The role of the law is to establish a standard, 8
and it is more important in this context that the law establish some
15 See id. at 33-34.
16 See Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299, 306-07 (1984).
17 Modern cipher systems rest on the idea that computers are unable to factor the
product of very large prime numbers. The power of these systems itself has generated
concerns about privacy and law enforcement. For a discussion of cryptography and
computer networks, see Stephen T. Kent, Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail, Comm. ACM,
Aug. 1993, at 48, 50.
Is For an economic analysis of the process of standardization, see Joseph Farrell,
Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 Jurimetrics J. 35 (1989); Joseph Farrell &
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standard, rather than the optimal one. The essence of the law of
property is that it binds those who are not parties to the transac-
tion; therefore, a title registration system can work only if it has the
imprimatur of the state.
Even if we are to retain the current system, in which only
secured creditors must file, and in which we require them only to
give notice that they have or may take a security interest in prop-
erty of the debtor, we must still take changes in technology into
account. It makes sense to index the filing system by the debtor's
taxpayer identification number. Given that the filing system will
be searched electronically, we should rethink what it should con-
tain. For example, it may not be cost effective to build a system
that requires the financing statement to have any description of the
collateral.19 We may also want to impose greater duties on the
secured party to ensure that the filing has been made correctly.20
In confronting these questions of how to reform the filing sys-
tem, we must keep in mind the relative importance of the problem.
For instance, confusion as to ownership may not be important to
trade creditors and others who rely on the cash-flow of the firm in
order to be paid, rather than on the firm's assets. Because trade
creditors know that they will be paid only if the firm survives as an
ongoing concern, it is a matter of indifference to them whether the
firm leases capital equipment or buys it and finances the purchase
with a security interest. The firm may fail if the debtor cannot
make payments to the equipment financer, but the firm will also
fail if the firm cannot make payments to its lessor. Moreover,
trade creditors are indifferent as to whether multiple creditors
claim security interests in the asset. In a world in which trade cred-
itors receive only a few cents on the dollar in the event of a firm's
reorganization, what may matter the most may be the total debt
obligations of the firm relative to its cash flow.
Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 Rand J. Econ. 70
(1985).
19 See Morris G. Shanker, A Proposal for a Simplified All-Embracing Security Interest,
14 UCC L.J. 23, 26-27 (1981).
20 Under current law, the secured party is not responsible for mistakes that the filing
officer makes in filing the financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-403(1); see also In re Royal
Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1973) (construing Pennsylvania law in accordance
with U.C.C. § 9-403(1)).
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As this country's economy changes, the capital assets of a firm
may become less important. In service industries, a firm's value
may be locked up in the firm-specific human capital of its employ-
ees. Alternatively, the value of the firm may rest in customer lists,
patents, computer software, or some other intellectual property
that is neither created nor transferred in the same way as a tangible
asset. The lender who wants to finance the acquisition of such
assets and ensure that it has a priority with respect to these assets,
however, does not need a security interest. Such a lender could
require the debtor to set up a separate corporation for the new
project, write covenants that ensure that the subsidiary would not
take on other debt, and then lend on an unsecured basis to the
subsidiary. The investor could, of course, obtain additional confi-
dence of its priority by taking a security interest in all the assets of
the subsidiary and taking a security interest in all of the stock of
the subsidiary held by the parent company, but its priority is
ensured in the first instance by creating a separate corporate
vehicle.
II. PROPERTY AND PRIORITY
Security interests under Anglo-American law have always been
tied to particular assets. A creditor acquired an interest in a partic-
ular piece of real and personal property and looked to it first to
obtain repayment.2' The history of secured credit is one in which a
debtor's assets have become increasingly available to creditors to
use in satisfying the debtor's obligations.2 2 As the modem corpo-
ration emerged, investors became more likely to try to take priority
over others with respect to all'of a debtor's assets.Y The reasons
for this are not hard to divine. The capital structures of the rail-
roads of the late nineteenth century, for example, were often a
patchwork of different mergers and different financings. One
lender might have a security interest in the rolling stock, another a
security interest in a terminal, another in the main line, and still
others in various branch lines. Such a fragmented capital structure
21 1 Gilmore, supra note 1, § 9.1, at 288.
22 See id.
23 See generally Gilmore, supra note 2 (describing the evolution of the good faith
purchase idea in commercial law).
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made it hard to restructure debt when, as often proved the case,
the firm did not have enough revenues to meet its fixed
obligations.
Over the last century, firms have gravitated toward capital struc-
tures that are strictly hierarchical-that is, a single creditor will
have a security interest in all the assets of a firm and other credi-
tors will all take a position that is junior to this single creditor's
position. 4 When the firm encounters financial distress, the amount
owed this creditor may exceed the value of the firm. Thus, the
financial restructuring problem is not one involving the debtor and
many creditors, but one involving the debtor and a single creditor.
If we assume that investors as a group are better off with strictly
hierarchical capital structures,25 we can identify another weakness
that flows from connecting security interests to particular assets.
To create strictly hierarchical capital structures, no connection
need exist between security interests and particular assets. Even
though bankruptcy is designed to solve collective action problems,
a perfected secured creditor that is owed more than the assets are
worth may prefer that the debtor file a bankruptcy petition under
the current system because nonbankruptcy rules do not work as a
coherent whole and do not make it easy to reach all the debtor's
assets. Moreover, the debtor may have real and personal property
in multiple jurisdictions. Seizing the property, and at the same
time preserving the value of the firm as a going concern, may be
possible only in bankruptcy because the current set of rules does
not allow a creditor to levy on the assets of the entire firm outside
of bankruptcy.
The all-asset financer can be viewed as an investor who bargains
for priority over all other investors in the event that the firm's capi-
tal structure needs to be overhauled. If we adopt this view, how-
ever, two different kinds of questions arise. First, we want to know
24 For a discussion of the important role that this large secured creditor plays in the firm,
see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901
(1986).
25 The question of why firms possess the capital structures that they do remains a puzzle,
given the Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Proposition. Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 261, 288 (1958). For a review of the literature, see Milton Harris & Artur
Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. Fin. 297 (1991).
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if in fact strictly hierarchical structures are likely to be desirable
when investors bargain for them. Second, if they are, we want to
know exactly how the law should respond to them.
Existing law does not seem to allow investors to opt out of bank-
ruptcy law. Moreover, investors in firms are often trade creditors
who typically offer a standard set of terms that do not vary for
individual customers. The terms are set based on conditions in the
industry as a whole, and not the characteristics of a particular
debtor; thus, it may not be plausible to think that each firm could,
by private contracting or provisions in its charter, create the capital
structure that was in everyone's best interest because the transac-
tion costs may simply be too high. In addition, strictly hierarchical
capital structures are not self-evidently desirable: one can make
arguments about why various departures from the absolute priority
rule might be efficient, and indeed a number of scholars have.26 It
is also arguable that, as a normative matter, absolute priority
should not be recognized even if such arrangements were to
emerge through private bargaining. 7
In the end, however, not much can be done to avoid strictly hier-
archical capital structures if in fact the principal investors want
them.28 Once we view secured debt as simply one kind of invest-
ment instrument in a firm, it becomes hard to do much to alter the
capital structures for which the parties bargain. Secured debt, ordi-
nary debt, subordinated debt, preferred stock, common stock, and
everything in between are different kinds of investment contracts.
The emergence of derivatives in the last decade underscores the
26 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial
Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital (Chicago Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 16, 1992) (supporting rule allowing ex post violations of absolute priority);
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989) (supporting
rules that favor ex ante bargains).
27 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for the Repeal of Chapter 11, 102
Yale L.J. 437, 472-74 (1992) (arguing that a contract-based priority system would
disadvantage nonparties to the transaction).
28 See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out"
Problem, 72 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1994).
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idea that every financial instrument can be rewritten in any
number of different ways. 9
Moreover, the ability to create parent and subsidiary firms, and
the ability to write covenants governing the obligations such firms
can incur, in principle allows investors to insulate themselves from
the workings of bankruptcy law altogether. As a result, a subsidi-
ary can engage in the actual business enterprise and the parent cor-
poration can write a series of contracts with investors that give
them different rights to the cash flows. Such a structure could have
whatever risk-sharing investors wanted to have and operate com-
pletely free of bankruptcy law.
Even if we write bankruptcy laws or laws governing security
interests that try to redistribute the assets of a firm ex post, parties
may be able to opt out of these laws through private contractual
arrangements. The effect of laws that attempt to alter contractual
distributions may largely be to increase transactions costs. Thus, if
one either accepts the results of private ordering or recognizes its
inevitability, it may make sense to alter the law of secured transac-
tions in a way that facilitates the creation of strictly hierarchical
capital structures. A law that gives investors priority rights to par-
ticular assets may not be the best approach.
There are several ways in which the rights of the lender who
takes priority over others might change. Unlike the equipment
financer, this lender is not necessarily looking to particular hard
assets and might not, for example, insist on limiting the ability of
the debtor to sell assets beyond what all creditors would provide in
their loan agreements.3 With this in mind, we might provide that
an investor could obtain a priority over other investors in the event
that the firm needed a new capital structure without necessarily
giving the creditor a right to reach specific assets.
29 For a discussion of derivatives and the challenge they pose for tax laws, see Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460
(1993).
30 Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private vs. Public Lending: Evidence from
Covenants 9 tbl. 2, 10 (June 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
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III. TRANSACTIONAL FILING IN AN ELECTRONIC ERA
To the extent that investors want to know about the capital struc-
ture of a firm, the problem we face is much more an issue of corpo-
rate law than one ordinarily associated with secured transactions.
To the extent that we want a secured creditor to give public notice,
the information in the Article 9 filing system may not be enough.'
The revolution brought about by the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act and confirmed by Article 9 was notice filing. The filing system
provides only limited information because the burdens of transac-
tional filing were enormous in a world before photocopying
machines, long-distance telephone lines, or personal computers.
Those burdens, however, are no longer with us. Indeed, one could
now argue that the filing obligation should be extended to general
creditors as well as secured creditors. One could also argue for
requiring all investors in a firm to record the amount of their
investment and the priority rights they claim in a firm's assets, and
requiring them to update that information continuously.
Of course, we might limit the system to exclude creditors of
small amounts or creditors of a particular type. But even some
creditors, such as employees, who initially seem to belong outside
the system, might readily be placed inside it. Just as a firm has an
obligation (backed up by criminal penalties) to pay withholding
taxes, a firm could have a similar obligation to record the amount
owed to each of its employees.
Under a reformed filing system, the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion could be accompanied by a printout of the public record of the
firm's capital structure. In the past, such a system was technically
infeasible; the burdens of filing this information would have been
enormous and retrieving it would be so hard that the filing would
be able to provide only limited information to others. But with
technological change and new standards, extracting the needed
31 This idea that technological change may make a return to a more transaction-based
filing system feasible is discussed in LoPucki, supra note 11, at 34-36. The idea that the law
of security interests in personal property should return to a system of transactional filing is
one that has resurfaced a number of times. See, e.g., Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien,"
72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 879-80 (1959); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1178-82 (1979).
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information from loan agreements or commercial invoices might
be straightforward and possible with small attendant costs.
Yet another problem associated with transactional filing is the
increased possibility that, as more information is required to be
kept in a file, the more likely it is that a file will contain informa-
tion that a firm might legitimately want to keep out of the hands of
competitors. Existing technology, however, makes it possible to
have a public file that contains private information. With
advances in cryptography, it may be possible to limit access to
information in any number of different ways. For instance, the
information could be stored so that the debtor could at all times
control who had access to it. Thus, a trade creditor could learn
what assets the debtor had available, what rights others enjoyed in
the firm, and where its claim would fit in the hierarchy if, but only
if, the debtor was willing to provide that information.
IV. THE UNITARY SECURITY INTEREST
Article 9 provides a set of terms that applies to all secured trans-
actions, regardless of their form, and is designed to create a secur-
ity interest in personal property.3 3 The same rules presumptively
apply to all secured transactions. Chattel paper financers and
retailers of consumer goods presumptively raise the same set of
problems for the lawmaker, but we impose different filing obliga-
tions on these lenders and we grant them different priority rights.
Nevertheless, the starting assumption is that they are the same
because they both have security interests in personal property.
By starting with this presumption, we create the risk that we
make a Procrustean bed, one that may be as confining as the one
from which the drafters of Article 9 escaped when they abolished
the distinctions between the many different legal forms that gov-
erned economically identical transactions. Instead of beginning
with the idea that there are artificial legal forms that are part of the
landscape, we should begin with the idea that the world of secured
transactions is one that is flat and that has discrete boundaries.
This assumption has its own dangers. As debt markets change, we
need to be sensitive to them.
32 See Kent, supra note 17.
33 See 1 Gilmore, supra note 1, § 10.1.
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The closely held firm typically has one institutional lender.34 Its
other creditors consist of insiders (these include, for example, rela-
tives of the owner-manager) and trade creditors. The amount of
trade credit typically expands as the firm encounters financial dis-
tress and the trade creditors typically receive nothing if the firm
liquidates. Because the firm does business in limited liability form,
the creditors have no recourse against the owner-manager. In
many instances, however, the institutional lender has obtained a
guarantee from the owner-manager. This guarantee is often
secured by all the assets of the owner-manager, including all of her
personal property.
When the owner-manager has substantial assets, the guarantee is
a device to ensure that the owner-manager, from the perspective of
the institutional lender, is not doing business in limited liability
form. In some cases, however, the owner-manager does not have
substantial nonencumbered assets. The owner-manager's wealth is
tied up in the business and the house is already subject to a first
mortgage. The other assets of the owner-manager (such as the car
and household furnishings) are small relative to the size of the
debt. If the firm fails, the owner-manager likely files a bankruptcy
petition as well, and the institutional lender may in fact receive lit-
tle or nothing on its guarantee.
In this case, the institutional lender does not use the guarantee
as a means of recovering what it is owed. The security interest is
best seen as a hostage-taking device.35 The institutional lender
wants to ensure that the owner-manager pays attention to its inter-
ests in times of financial distress. The ability to call on the assets of
the owner-manager, even if these assets are not themselves valua-
ble to the lender, may be a great value to the owner-manager.
How are we to think about this use of security interests as a gen-
eral matter, before we confront the question of how or where legal
rules should respond to this device? First, we can observe that the
assets of the owner-manager are themselves ideal hostages. The
point is one that Robert Scott has made looking at the use of
34 See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Firm-Creditor
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data 8-9 (May 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
35 See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 730, 746-48 (1989).
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secured debt in consumer loans. 6 The assets are analogous to a
puny prince. They have value to the hostage-giver but little value
to the hostage-taker, especially when the owner-manager's equity
in the house is small relative to the value of the loan that the credi-
tor has made to the owner-manager's firm.
The owner-manager can give this security confident that the
institutional lender will not declare a default merely to reach these
assets or to exercise control over them. The institutional lender
will exercise control over the assets only to hold the owner-man-
ager to her bargain and to ensure her cooperation in complying
with the terms of the loan to the firm. The security in this case thus
has a low risk of opportunistic behavior. The lender will use the
threat of calling on the guarantee and asserting its rights as a
secured creditor to enforce the rights it bargained for under the
security agreement.
There are several points to make about this transaction. First,
the device is not one in which the collateral ensures that the lender
will be repaid, because the debtor may have no other creditors
(other than the bank with a first mortgage on the debtor's home).
Second, even if the debtor has other creditors, the lender often
does not care about priority. If the owner-manager is solvent, all
the creditors of the owner-manager will be paid. If, as is often the
case, the owner-manager's assets are worth far less than the debt
owed the institutional lender, the priority that the lender enjoys
with respect to the owner-manager's personal assets does little to
ensure that it will be repaid.
The advantages that the institutional lender enjoys in this con-
text are ones that are largely independent of whether the lender's
security interest in the owner-manager's own assets is perfected. It
may be desirable to require the institutional lender to make a filing
that puts the other creditors (of the owner-manager) on notice, but
this issue is not likely to matter. The owner-manager likely does
not have other creditors and in any event, priority over these credi-
tors is not likely to matter much. What matters are the effects that
the guarantee has on the relationship between the institutional
lender and the owner-manager's firm.
36 Id.
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When the owner-manager has few assets and the insider-guaran-
tee is largely a hostage-giving device, it is not obvious that we
should allow this transaction to go forward at all. To be sure, this
case may be hard to separate from the case in which the owner-
manager has assets and the guarantee with the security interest is
simply a device to opt out of limited liability. In an environment in
which all the debt of the firm is consensual, there seems to be no
reason to prevent parties from opting in or out of limited liability if
they choose to do so. The only qualification rests on the different
transaction costs that the different creditors face. The mechanics
of signing such guarantees and making the requisite filings, espe-
cially in the real estate records, may be too burdensome for the
trade creditors, each of whom has less at stake (at least initially)
than an institutional lender.
When the owner-manager has few assets, however, this kind of
secured transaction may impose costs on third parties. The guaran-
tee (reinforced by the security interest) serves two purposes. First,
it reduces the chance of debtor misbehavior. The owner-manager
is much less likely to act in a way that puts the creditors as a whole
at risk. The lender with the guarantee has the ability to seize assets
that, although not valuable to the lender, are valuable to the
owner-manager and that the owner-manager will not want to put at
risk. From this perspective, the guarantee favors all the creditors.
Second, the owner-manager may tend to favor the lender with
this security interest at the expense of other creditors of the firm.
This is problematic if the other creditors are nonconsensual or if
the transaction costs of entering into such a guarantee keep others
from doing so. If they all had this right, this problem would disap-
pear, but the high transaction costs may keep this from happening.
Viewed from this perspective, the institutional lender is in a
position analogous to that of the IRS. The IRS likely has the abil-
ity to pursue the owner-manager personally if the tax obligations
of the firm are not met.37 This power gives the owner-manager
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1988), establishing that
[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax... shall ... be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of
the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
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an incentive to favor the IRS when encountering financial
distress.38
In terms of law reform, we confront two issues. First, we con-
front the bankruptcy question of the reach of the law of voidable
preferences.39 Second, and less well appreciated, we face a
nonbankruptcy question about the reach of fraudulent conveyance
law and the ability it gives other creditors of a firm to reach trans-
fers made to a creditor when that transfer also benefits an insider
because of the guarantee. To be sure, such transfers seem to be
made for "reasonably equivalent value" if one characterizes the
transaction as a transfer to the lender, but one can characterize the
transaction quite differently, and the idea of the fraudulent prefer-
ence has deep roots in the law of fraudulent conveyances.40
This view of secured credit and the potential problems that
secured credit presents for other creditors is fundamentally differ-
ent from the problem that arises when the collateral is an asset of
the debtor instead of a third party. Collateral that can be levied
upon by other creditors and that will be levied upon is not a hos-
tage. The debtor will not get to keep it anyway and hence has no
reason to favor the secured creditor over others.
38 Such tax payments on the eve of bankruptcy are not voidable preferences under § 547
of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988); see Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990)
(holding that tax fund payments were transfers of property held in trust, and therefore not
avoidable as preferences).
39 Under the existing law, transfers to a creditor with an insider guarantee are subject to
preference attack for a year, rather than the usual 90 days. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194-1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the preference-
recovery period for outside creditors is one year when payment produces a benefit for an
inside creditor, including a guarantor). As currently written, however, the one-year
preference window applies not only to insiders like the owner-manager, but also to
guarantees among related corporations, see id., which present a different problem. In
addition, lenders may be able to avoid the preference attack but otherwise enjoy all the
same benefits by having the owner-manager waive her rights of reimbursement and
equitable subrogation.
40 See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 643, 657 (1985); see also Bullard
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that relationship of parties in
settlement agreement made transfer fraudulent under Bankruptcy Act); Andrew J.
Nussbaum, Comment, Insider Preferences and the Problem of Self-Dealing Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 603 (1990) (arguing that transfers made by or for the
benefit of insiders should be scrutinized under both the fraudulent conveyance provision
and the fraudulent preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code).
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V. SECURITY INTERESTS, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION,
AND STANDARDS
It is common in some industries (notably the textile industry) for
a firm to sell its accounts to a third party on a nonrecourse basis.41
The third party has no ability to sue the debtor if the value of the
accounts proves to be less than expected, nor does the third party
have to return anything to the firm if more is received than
expected. We can think of this transaction as the sale of an intangi-
ble asset. The transaction takes place because the factor places a
higher value on the asset than the firm. The asset, of course, is a
promise to pay a stream of money, and cash is fungible, but some-
one who purchases accounts has expertise that the firm does not.
A factor may have a better sense of the risks associated with this
income stream and may be better diversified to absorb the risks. In
addition, the factor may know more about the creditworthiness of
various account debtors and may also be better able to collect
debts and keep track of what is owing. In this sense, the factor may
be the higher-valued user of the asset.
The last ten years has seen a revolution in financial markets.
Debt is now securitized to the extent that it has never been before.
(The amount has risen from 45% of the $3.8 trillion debt market in
1980 to 65% of the $15 trillion debt market today.) The value of a
firm's accounts receivable turns, like the value of any other asset,
on the firm's ability to sell it. Creating a law that facilitates the sale
of an asset is, others things being equal, a good thing.42
Legal rules confront two different problems in dealing with fac-
toring. First, legal rules can establish a set of norms and conven-
tions that make it easier for the parties themselves to enter into the
transaction. A set of rules that makes it easy for the account debt-
ors to know whom they are supposed to pay works to everyone's
advantage. Legal rules, however, must also confront the third-
41 For a discussion of the practice of factoring, see 1 Gilmore, supra note 1, §§ 5.1, 5.2.
42 Decisions such as Octagon Gas Sys. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve), 995 F.2d
948 (10th Cir. 1993), which make it harder to insulate accounts that are sold from the
effects of a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, id. at 955-58, are subject to criticism on these
grounds. For a discussion of the importance of the idea of a true sale in this context, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How Securitization of
Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to
Middle-Market Companies, 1993 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 139, 143-49.
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party effects of such a transaction. Because the debtor has no con-
trol over these accounts after it sells them to the factor, none of the
potential for manipulation that we saw in the case of the security
interest supporting the insider guarantor exists. Because the assets
are intangible, we do not have the problem of a debtor who
appears to be the owner because of possession,43 and we also do
not have the ostensible ownership problem that we encountered in
the case of the equipment lessor.
Moreover, there are reasons to think that the general creditors
are not likely to be misled. Trade creditors typically receive noth-
ing when firms liquidate. They extend credit knowing that their
ability to be repaid turns on the firm's ability to generate new
accounts, so it should not matter to them whether the debtor pays
them as it is paid by its account debtors or pays them from the
proceeds it realizes when it sells the accounts to a factor.
There are, however, two problems that are worth considering.
First, we may want to worry about the factoring of accounts that
takes place when the debtor is already in financial distress. This
factoring is not itself a preference, because the factor gives new
value, but there is a sudden change in the condition of the debtor
that is not readily apparent to the other creditors. Trade creditors
rely upon such things as the debtor's ability to pay them regularly
to draw inferences about the debtor's financial health and whether
they should continue to ship goods and extend credit. The debtor's
ability to reach sources of credit that are invisible to them clouds
this signal and is therefore a source of potential mischief. In this
respect, the factoring of accounts while in financial distress, like the
ability of the IRS to enjoy priority over trade creditors when the
debtor diverts FICA funds, is a source of legitimate concern.
Second, the filing requirements we impose on factors help trade
creditors only if they regularly check the filings. The cost of a
search is large if a trade creditor must do it each time it ships goods
to each one of its debtors. (The $5 cost is modest in any large
transaction, but it is a substantial cost if it must be done twelve
times a year for all of a firm's customers.) Looked at through this
lens, the question to ask is whether the trustee should be able to
avoid such sales of accounts if they are done on the eve of bank-
43 See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 362-63 (1925).
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ruptcy. One can argue that a statute similar to the bulk sales law
should apply in such cases. A factor should be obliged to give
actual notice to creditors and risk that the transfer of accounts to it
will be avoided if the debtor fails within ninety days or some other
prebankruptcy window.
Article 6, however, has not been a conspicuous success. 44 One
can argue that such a legal regime would make it hard for debtors
facing a cash crunch to weather the storm and might, in the long
term, make trade creditors themselves worse off because more
debtors would fail. Alternatively, one can imagine variations on
the notification rules that would be more effective. We could, for
example, create a filing system in which trade creditors could file.
The factor could insulate the sale of the accounts from a voidable
preference attack if it sent notice to all trade creditors who filed
under the debtor's name or taxpayer identification number.
One could, of course, conclude that this game was not worth the
candle. But we risk missing a potential problem that secured credit
may pose to third parties if we treat a factor or an accounts receiva-
ble financer as being the same sort of animal as the purchase-
money lender. The purchase-money lender who extends credit
when the debtor is in financial distress does not distort the signal
the trade creditors receive about changes in the financial condition
of the debtor.
The sale of accounts raises another problem as well. There is
always the risk that a debtor can make multiple and necessarily
fraudulent transfers of the same asset. The rule that we can infer
ownership from possession serves to ameliorate this problem in the
case of tangible assets, but does no good in the event of intangible
assets such as accounts. One of the virtues of the filing system is
that it allows one to sort out ownership rights in a way that makes
it easy to know where one stands. A factor who purchases
accounts wants to be sure that no one has already purchased them.
A filing system serves this purpose. But if we have a filing system
for this reason, other characteristics of the law become suspect.
44 Revised Article 6 gives states the option to repeal bulk sales altogether. U.C.C. art. 6,
Alternative A. A number of jurisdictions have already done this. See, e.g., 1993 Fla. Laws
ch. 93-77, § 3; 1991 Ill. Laws P.A. 87-308, § 1; 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 570, § 16.
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For example, it is not clear that a lien creditor should be able to
prime the factor who fails to file or fails to file correctly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have looked at some basic transactions that are
now covered under Article 9 and have used them to reexamine
some of its basic assumptions. The drafters built Article 9 around
several basic propositions. First, they believed that the idea of the
secured transaction was a useful legal construct. The transactions
that fell within its scope were presumptively of the same type, for
which the same legal rules were appropriate. Second, the drafters
believed there were sound reasons for protecting the bona fide
purchaser in all guises. Third, the link between possession and
ownership was the foundation of the law of secured transactions.
Finally, the third-party problems that security interests created
were best solved through a system of notice filing. After so long a
time, notwithstanding its great success, these basic assumptions
should be subject to closer scrutiny.
Quite apart from the boundary problems that inevitably arise,
there is little that a security interest that secures the guarantee of a
corporate insider has in common with the equipment lessor or the
factor or the asset-based lender who takes a security interest in all
the assets of a debtor. Second, in a world in which information is
imperfect, one may not want to rest with the idea that a lender who
gives value should be entitled to a security interest. There is no
reason to assume that protecting the bona fide purchaser for value
in all guises is in the joint interests of all the investors in a firm.45
A factor that lends to a firm in financial distress may make it
harder for other investors in the firm to learn about the debtor's
financial condition.
Third, the common-law idea of ownership based on derivation
and possession may not make sense in a world in which it may be
much easier to create a registration system for all assets of any
value. Finally, notice filing may not make sense in an electronic
world in which information can be encrypted and it is possible to
require all investors in a debtor to register their interests so that
45 See Gilmore, supra note 2.
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anyone who needs to know can, at any moment, accurately learn
the capital structure of the firm.
One cannot expect radical change in Article 9, given how well it
has served us for so long. Radical change that is desirable in the-
ory may not be desirable in practice, because of the uncertainties
inherent in implementing new ideas. Even if we desired such
change, the political forces that are in place may prevent even the
most sensible reforms in such things as the filing system. In con-
templating reform, however, it is worth reexamining first princi-
ples. The legacy of Dunham, Gilmore, Llewellyn, and
Mentschikoff is not merely a great commercial code, but also a leg-
acy that recognizes that commercial law scholarship should be
neither tradition bound nor mechanical. It should be done in the
Grand Style.46
46 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 35-45 (1960).
For a discussion of the Grand Style, see William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement 203-69 (1973). For one view of the Grand Style and the Uniform Commercial
Code, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 621, 632 n.39 (1975).
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